Defences
Dann accepted a lift in a car driven by Hamilton, who had been drinking intoxicating liquor.
On the journey an accident occurred and Dann was injured.
Volenti non fit injuria did not apply.
CON Dann had knowledge of a potential danger and was aware of Hamilton's state when accepting the lift.
She did not assent, however, to negligent driving.
See also: SMITH v. BAKER (1891)
A van was negligently left unattended in the street.
A boy threw a stone at the horses with the result that they bolted.
A woman and a child were in danger.
A policeman rushed to stop the horses, and was injured.
He could recover.
He was under a clear moral (or even legal) duty to help.
However, a special relationship and a special duty of protection: master-servant, patient-doctor etc.
He would have been debarred if he was merely meddlesome or foolhardy.
Case of a clear moral or legal duty to act as a defence.
National Coal Board v. J. E. Evans & Co. (Cardiff) Ltd. 1951
The plaintiffs placed an electric cable under certain land.
A firm of contractors employed by the landowners to excavate a trench in the land caused damage to the cable.
The defendants were not held liable.
They had no knowledge of the cable.
They had no reason to assume that there was a cable under the land.
'Inevitable accident' case.
Rigby v. Chief Constable of Northhamptonshire 1985
A psychopath had gone into a building and refused to come out.
In order to get him, the police fired a canister of C.S. into the building.
The house went on fire.
The police claimed that this was a necessity.
It was a situation with necessity in it, but the police had to pay damages.
They negligently fired the gas without taking precaution in case this would happen.
Compare:
A workman was employed to drill rock in a cutting. He knew that a crane carrying loads of stones constantly swung over his head, and that there was danger that a stone might drop on him.
Due to the negligent manner in which his employers allowed the crane to be operated a stone did drop, and the workman was injured.
The workman was allowed to recover.
Mere knowledge of the danger - under the circumstances - does not imply that someone consents to run the risk of injury.
But outside a master-servant relationship knowledge of an existing risk coupled with a continuation of the activity to which it is incident, may sometimes be treated as equivalent to consent to incur it. See also:
Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. 1956
An Esso tank ship did not land on the harbour, but on the property of the plaintiff.
The captain had to make the ship lighter, so he released oil.
The ship would have broken if he had not released the oil on the land.
This was a necessity.
Otherwise it would have been a worse disaster.
There is the defence of necessity, but you do not have it when you caused the necessity.
Compare:
Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams 1971
A homeless couple decided to enter a vacant house in order to live in it:
When they were told to be trespassers, they claimed necessity.
This is not necessity.
Necessity in these kinds of cases would open a door nobody could control (policy decision).
Compare:
Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co. 1860
A railway company was authorised by statute to run a railway which traversed the plaintiff's land.
Sparks from the engine set fire to the plaintiff's woods.
The railway company was not liable.
It had taken all known care to prevent emission of sparks; the running of locomotives was statutorily authorised.
Case of statutory authorization of a dangerous activity as a defence.